Whether it is to continue illegal activities on the outside, to plan an escape or to chat with friends and family, inmate use of cell phones is a security problem for correctional facilities across the country.

And, unfortunately, little technology has been developed to assist corrections agencies in locating these phones. But the Bureau of Prisons hopes to change all that.

Recently the BOP completed a series of tests on technologies that detect the radio frequencies used by cell phones with the idea that in the end, a device usable in corrections would be the result.

"We have for years been looking for solutions and over the years have seen a lot of technologies that didn't work or were not appropriate. The evidence presented to us showed us that they wouldn't work. [But] our news mission was to find or develop a solution," said Jim Mahan, Senior Technologist, Office of Security Technology, Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Recently Mahan and Ike Eichenlaub, Chief of the Office of Security Technology, spoke with The Corrections Connection about its study, the findings and their hope for technology development in this area. Because the BOP does not want to endorse products, officials did not want to specifically discuss the companies involved.

Q: How big of a problem is cell phone use in corrections facilities in general?

Eichenlaub: We surveyed our own facilities, which number 106, and determined there were a substantial number of cell phones confiscated from inmates in fiscal year 2003. We've also talked with a number of colleagues in state correctional systems and they also indicate cell phones are being confiscated in large numbers as well.

Mahan: Also, because of the digital capabilities of cell phones, pictures can be taken of security or of high-profile inmates, which adds to the vulnerability of an institution.

Q: What are the possible technological responses to this problem?

Mahan: We've looked at three or four technological approaches -- the biggest being jamming as the end-all solution or what's described as brute force, overpowering jamming. Then there is selective jamming where you do strategic or surgical precision jamming of the immediate environment.

Eichenlaub: The third option is spoofing where you trick a cell phone. You set up your own antenna in the institution and let the cell phone believe that you are the closed station and it sends a signal back saying 'denial of service.'
The next option is passive interception where you use an antenna and software to intercept the cell phone signals. The phone is talking to a cell tower and the exact cell number and the number being called can be detected. Then, from there, you can use the resources you have to do an investigation to get your hands on it.

The problem with each of those is jamming and denial-of-service are illegal and prohibited by the FCC. Passive interception is legal, but you have to have an order from a judge because it is essentially wire-tapping.

Mahan: And, even if you got the order, we tested equipment and found it was complicated to use in a correctional environment and that it was more intended for the law enforcement environment where you target a specific phone.
Also when we tested passive interception equipment, they have hand-held devices that enable you to point to determine where a signal is coming from and found it didn't work as well in a correctional environment. This leaves us with the fourth option - detection and location.

Q: What types of technologies did the BOP test and in what environment?

Eichenlaub: We looked for engineering firms and companies and we found many that had expertise with detention and tested with one of those companies.
Testing was done in a real facility prior to it being populated. It was a brand new facility, for general population. It was a medium security facility comprised of three housing units each with two wings and has four tiers in each wing. That's very representative of modern prison construction.

Mahan: The technologies we looked at are referencing U.S. regulations and laws. A lot of technologies tout [the ability to] find cell phones, but they do so overseas. Countries in Asia, for example, have different regulations. They jam restaurants and movie theaters over there. We were also looking at technologies that had broad detection capabilities. Some might detect it at a doorway if the phones are on and within 3 to 4 feet of it. That's not practical to put a device at every cell door inside a prison.

The technology that we looked at, tested and liked was deploying a collection of sensors around the unit in an out-of-the-way location. They detected the radio frequency power emanating from a cell phone when it was on.

Q: What were the results of the testing?

Eichenlaub: As soon as the cell phone was turned on, the technology would see a spike in the radio frequency and record that power level. It was pretty accurate. In our list of requirements, we indicate that the system we want to see operational, and we even hope to purchase, should put us within three cells of where the cell phone is located and if it is outside, we'd like it to put us within a 50 foot radius.

One of the things that complicates this is inmates are good at hiding things. If a technology merely shows us what housing unit the cell phone is located in, it is helpful, but by the time we get over there, it will already be hidden very deeply.

Mahan: We don't look forward to searching 160 cells for something as small as a cell phone. Our expectation is this technology has to work very quickly in a small window of opportunity.

Q: Is there anything else that shows up in the same radio frequency that would be detected by these devices?

Eichenlaub: Anything that communicates. Radios that officers and staff use, pagers that staff commonly carry, all of that communicates in the RF spectrum. But, every device uses a specific slot or frequency and cell phones are designated to use certain frequencies. One should be able to detect cell phones in certain RFs and not interfere with radios, pagers etc.

Mahan: The downside of what we are doing is if the sensors are not sensitive enough, we don't get enough coverage and if they are too sensitive, they will detect a cell phone on the street.

Eichenlaub: No one is allowed to have a cell phone in the prison, but the second you walk out of the door staff can use the cell phones in the parking lot.

Q: What needs to be done to alter these devices for corrections applications?

Mahan: The actual detection, which is what the vendor is doing, is the hard technical part. Then these graphical user interfaces are not rocket science.

We haven't had a chance to test anything yet [in a live corrections environment.]. There are at least a couple of technologies that are close to having prototypes ready to test. It's difficult to say what downsides there are when we haven't had it in our live environment.

We haven't seen the connection between cell phone signal detection [and] the officer being able to see it. The device we are ready to purchase doesn't exist yet. It needs to be engineered to fit our environment.

Q: Would corrections agencies be able to afford these for each institution?

Eichenlaub: Cost has been a factor in the development since the beginning. We've seen $250,000 systems that say they can do it and can't. We expect this to come in at a price point that would be available to most corrections facilities.

The first system would be expensive then the more you buy the cheaper they are going to get. We've put the $30,000 to $50,000 range out there for coverage of a while facility. Cost is an issue for us as well.

Q: What kind of timeline do you see for this technology?

Eichenlaub: We're hoping to see something - a prototype from a couple of different companies -- late winter into spring of next year. There is at least one other company with a prototype ready to test. We think within a year there might be something on the market.